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Summary. Several simulation environments exist for the simulation of large-scale
evacuations of buildings, ships, or other enclosed spaces. These offer sophisticated
tools for the study of human behaviour, the recreation of environmental factors
such as fire or smoke, and the inclusion of architectural or structural features,
such as elevators, pillars and exits. Although such simulation environments can
provide insights into crowd behaviour, they lack the ability to examine potentially
dangerous forces building up within a crowd. These are commonly referred to as
crush conditions, and are a common cause of death in emergency evacuations.
In this paper, we describe a methodology for the prediction and mitigation of
crush conditions. The paper is organised as follows. We first establish the need for
such a model, defining the main factors that lead to crush conditions, and describ-
ing several exemplar case studies. We then examine current methods for studying
crush, and describe their limitations. From this, we develop a three-stage hybrid
approach, using a combination of techniques. We conclude with a brief discussion
of the potential benefits of our approach.
1 Introduction
The events of 9/11 were widely seen and examined in the safety community
and beyond. The catastrophic outcome and the minutiae of the evacuation
have been examined by numerous official agencies, research organizations,
media outlets, as well as Hollywood. Given this, the events of the day are
incredibly well known; possibly more so than any other recent event.
Tall buildings are designed based on the assumption that an evacuation
is managed, i.e. that the evacuation will take place in stages, if required,
with only certain sections of the population evacuating at any one time. The
evacuation will usually take place from those floors closest to the incident,
then occur from more distant floors. This assumption is key to the successful
evacuation of these tall structures; the stair capacity is calculated based on
the assumption that the majority of the population follow the evacuation
procedure. This means that the stair capacity within the structure will not
be sufficient for the simultaneous evacuation of the entire population.
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After 9/11 the assumption that tall buildings can be evacuated in a phased
and controlled manner is being questioned. Instead, it is often suggested
that evacuees will be reluctant to remain behind in a structure, fearful of a
failure in structural integrity similar to that experienced in the twin towers.
Given the nature of the incident on 9/11 and the possible consequences of
remaining within the building (either by choice or through compulsion), it
is now suggested that residents may choose to ignore the instructions of a
staged procedure and instead move to the stairwells. This may then overload
the available staircase capacity.
Given this is the case, the consequences of failure should be examined. If
there is a failure in the acceptance of procedure then either the failure should
be made as graceful as possible, or measures should be taken to resolve the
issue; in either case, an understanding of the consequences of failure is vital.
It should be noted that during these scenarios it is not assumed that
the conditions are dependent upon the existence of panic, which is difficult
to predict and rarely the dominant evacuee behaviour[1]. In reality, it has
been found that panic and irrational behaviour are a direct effect of the
deteriorating conditions, rather than the cause of the deterioration itself.
Here we are assuming that crush conditions may develop simply because of
the overloading of a route and may therefore be influenced by architectural,
procedural, or behavioural factors.
One of the consequences of a full evacuation from a tall structure, that
was originally designed for phased evacuation, is the overloading of an es-
cape route in a relatively short period of time. One of the most dangerous
consequences of such an incident is that the exits, such as those at the base
of stairways, would become overloaded, leading to many evacuees arriving
at a bottleneck; i.e. the exit component is used above and beyond its design
capacity. This may then lead to conditions similar to those observed at the
Rhode Island[2] and Gothenburg[3] incidents, where crush incidents and falls
were evident and lead to blocked egress routes and injuries. It is therefore
critical for the safety of tall structures to develop an understanding of: (1)
Exactly when these conditions may develop? (2) What factors need to be
present in order for crush conditions to occur? (3) When do these conditions
become critical? (4) How can we establish the possible consequences of this
type of incident and design against them?
Here, we outline a program of work that will enable the assessment of ar-
chitectural and procedural designs in order to establish whether they are
prone to crush conditions developing in certain scenarios, what the con-
sequences of this might be, and how we might best mitigate against this
event. The development of a similar tool is mentioned in the recommenda-
tions within the 9/11 report[4]:
NIST recommends that tall buildings be designed to accommo-
date timely full building evacuation of occupants when required in
building-specific or large-scale emergencies such as widespread power
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outages, major earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes without sufficient
advanced warning, fires, explosions, and terrorist attacks. Building
size, population, function, and iconic status should be taken into ac-
count in designing the egress system. Stairwell capacity and stair dis-
charge door width should be adequate to accommodate counter-flow
due to emergency access by responders.
Improved egress analysis models, design methodologies, and supporting
data should be developed to achieve target evacuation performance for the
building population by considering the building and egress system designs
and human factors such as occupant size, mobility status, stairwell tenability
conditions, visibility, and congestion.
Although numerous egress models exist that are able to simulate general
movement, none are able to simulate all of the conditions highlighted in NIST
recommendations, along with a comprehensive crush model. Developing such
a model, that is publicly available and that can be embedded into existing
egress tools, meets an identified need and will allow for a broad and vital
examination of these situations.
2 Definition of Crush Conditions
There are many factors that play a part in the initial formation of crush con-
ditions during an evacuation, these can be classified under the broad headings
of spatial, temporal, perceptual, procedural, and cognitive components.
2.1 Spatial
The spatial components of crush conditions are the simplest to quantify. They
relate to the ratio of space available for egress to the number of persons that
are expected to use the escape routes. Fruin defined this metric as the “level
of service”[5], and highlighted the level at which the population density has
the potential to facilitate the formation of crush as “Level of Service F”,
which is the density at which a single individual would have, on average,
less than 0.46m2 of space available to them. It should also be noted that the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) considers an evacuation to be
unsafe if, for 10% of the overall evacuation time, the density of the evacuees
reaches 4 persons per square metre[6]. This is due to the fact that, even at
relatively low levels of force, prolonged exposure to “light” crush conditions
may still cause serious injury or death.
2.2 Temporal
Temporal factors of egress vary, and depend heavily upon the rate at which
conditions change. The RSET (Required Safe Egress Time), defined as the
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elapsed time between the initialisation of an evacuation and the final evacuee
reaching safety[7], i.e. the time required for a complete evacuation under ideal
circumstances. The ASET (Available Safe Egress Time), defined as the total
time available for evacuation[7], is a far more specific metric, as it will vary
depending on the catalyst for evacuation (i.e. the nature of the emergency).
Traditionally, the RSET and ASET metrics have been used to determine
whether or not the occupants of a building could evacuate under specific
conditions. Generally, a structure could be considered safe if the ASET value
exceeds that of the RSET, i.e. there is more time available for an evacuation
than would be required. The rate at which conditions change can compound
time constraints, as the ASET calculation will change dynamically with the
changing conditions. The Rhode Island nightclub fire (see Section 3.1), is a
good example of this, and shows how the rapidity with which an incident
escalates can place severe time constraints on the evacuating population.
2.3 Perceptual and Cognitive Factors
Perceptual and cognitive factors that lead to the formation of crush conditions
are intrinsically linked, as an individual must rely on their perception of
events in order to decide upon a course of action. The individuals’ perceived
level of threat plays a large part in this, as it has the most direct effect on the
decision making process. Whilst the perception of threat plays a great part
in the decision making process, the relationship between these two factors
is highly complex, and can result in individuals displaying a wide range of
behaviour, from the altruistic at one end of the scale, right through to highly
competitive egress behaviour, e.g. running, pushing, etc.
The perception of information also plays a key part in the formation of
crush. During emergency situations, it is often found that information relating
to the current conditions is slow to propagate throughout a crowd of people,
e.g. the evacuees that are placed further back in a crowd may not be aware of
the conditions further ahead. This has been found in many situations, such
as the Hillsborough disaster (see Section 3.4), where the people attempting
to enter a structure were unaware of the already dangerously overcrowded
conditions that existed inside. In these cases the persons at the rear of a
crowd can compound the situation by producing additional force that will
propagate forward through the crowd, and also by limiting the extent to
which the pressure could be alleviated by inadvertently blocking the most
immediate exit routes.
2.4 Procedural
The procedural components of crush were already alluded to (see Section 1),
and centre around the inability, or unwillingness, of evacuees to follow strict
evacuation plans in emergency situations. This type of problem is extremely
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common in public buildings, where a great number of the occupants will
be unfamiliar with the structure and have little, or no, knowledge of the
evacuation plans, e.g. hospitals, town halls, museums, stadiums, etc. When
an evacuation takes place under these circumstances the crowd will often
attempt to leave by the most familiar route, generally the route by which
they entered, even though there may be exits in closer proximity. An example
of this type of behaviour can be found in the Rhode Island nightclub incident
(see Section 3.1), where the majority of the crowd converged at just one point
of escape, even though there were numerous other exits available.
2.5 Summary
The formation of crush conditions within crowds is a highly complex, emer-
gent phenomena, and the causes of this cannot be explained by simply at-
tributing it to the presence of panic within the crowd, which is widely re-
garded as being somewhat of a fallacy. We suggest that crush conditions can
only be reliably defined as a combination of all the factors mentioned above,
which culminate in the individuals’ inability to fully control their direction
and speed of movement, thus leading to an increase in the physical forces
that they are subject to.
3 Case Studies
Here we present case studies representing situations where the formation of
crush conditions have led to both serious injuries and fatalities. Each case
study also represents some failure within a system (e.g. failure to limit the
capacity of a structure to safe levels, failure to adhere to official guidelines or
fire laws, failure to follow crowd control policies, etc). These types of failure
are often observed in cases where the evacuation of a building leads to the
death or injury of many people. Failures of this kind are common, and we
believe that they should be expected, and be considered during the design
of buildings, the creation of evacuation plans, and especially in simulated
evacuation exercises.
3.1 Rhode Island Nightclub
The Station Nightclub, Rhode Island, was the scene of a tragedy when, on
February 20th 2003, a fire during a rock concert caused 100 fatalities and
significant injuries[2]. The fire started when the band’s pyrotechnics ignited
the flammable soundproofing foam that surrounded the stage, and quickly
filled the club with dense, choking smoke. The fire spread from the stage,
igniting a large portion of the ceiling, and within five minutes of the initial
ignition those outside the club observed flames breaking through a portion
of the roof.
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Despite the existence of four possible exits, the majority of the crowd
headed for the most familiar exit; the entrance to the club. This exit point
was soon overwhelmed, and people began to trip or fall during their escape.
The official time-line of the fire (compiled by NIST[2]) states that just 1
minute and 42 seconds after the start of the fire, there existed a “pile” of
people, blocking the main exit and making further egress through that route
impossible.
3.2 Gothenburg Dancehall
When fire broke out in a dancehall in Gothenburg, Sweden, on October 28th
1998, it claimed the lives of 63 people and injured over 180 others. The first
floor venue in question was packed to over double its 150 capacity, with
officials estimating that there may have been over 400 people in attendance.
Eye-witness accounts of the incident state that population density prior to
the start of the fire was already at dangerously high levels, with a number of
the occupants observing that there were so many people present that they
were unable to dance[3]. Shortly before midnight, a fire was discovered in one
of the two stairways leading out of the first floor dancehall, and those near
to the affected area began to evacuate. No announcement was made to the
remaining occupants, and some survivors who had been at the far end of the
hall when the fire was initially discovered stated that they smelled smoke but
had initially believed it to be cigarette smoke and felt no need to evacuate.
As the full evacuation began, the one remaining exit to the building quickly
became overwhelmed, and the mass of evacuees began to trip or fall over
others, further diminishing the capacity of the exit.
3.3 E2 Nightclub Incident
In Chicago’s E2 nightclub on Feb 17th 2003, the security guards’ use of
pepper spray, to intervene during an altercation, became the catalyst for an
evacuation that claimed the lives of 21 patrons[8]. When the security guards
released the pepper spray in an enclosed space, the effects of the chemical
compound on the surrounding crowd were significant. Those close to the
attack began to rush toward the exit in an attempt to escape the pepper
spray, which by this point was already spreading around the club. As the
initial wave of evacuees made their way through the club, those who had not
witnessed the incident began to fear for their safety, especially as it became
obvious that some form of chemical agent was present.
Within seconds the entire crowd, consisting of over 1500 people, rushed
towards the main exit. The door to the street opened inwards, whilst the
door leading to the dance floor opened outwards. As people rushed from the
club, the upper door flew outwards, pushing those on the upper landing down
the steep flight of stairs. As more people attempted to exit, they were forced
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on top of the fallen evacuees, and the bodies began to “stack up” and block
the exit. It was the tremendous pressure placed upon the fallen evacuees that
caused the 21 deaths during this incident. The most common cause of death
was asphyxiation.
3.4 Hillsborough
The Hillsborough disaster[9] (Sheffield, UK), claimed the lives of 96 people
and caused the hospitalisation of a further 300. Due to the heightened public
interest in the incident (the match had been transmitted live on English
television), and also because of the multiple perceived failures on the part
of the authorities, the Hillsborough disaster has become one of the most
thoroughly investigated crowd disasters in living memory.
The tragedy at Hillsborough stadium occurred when police stewarding
the match made the decision to open an extra set of gates, intended as an
exit, in order to relieve the extreme levels of congestion that were forming as
the crowds tried to enter the stadium through the turnstiles at the Lepping’s
Lane end of the ground. These gates did not have turnstiles, and the result
was an influx of up to 5,000 fans through the narrow corridor that lead into
the standing terrace. The sudden arrival of so many additional fans pushed
the capacity of the central pens far above their legal maximum, and soon a
dangerous crush formed at the front of the stands. Those fans still entering
the stadium were unaware of this, and continued to attempt to enter the
stand as the people inside were slowly crushed against the crowd barriers
and fences at the front of the stands. The conditions at the front of the
terrace became so bad that most of the 96 victims died from asphyxiation,
or other crush related injuries, within five minutes of the game starting.
4 Previous Work in the Field
In general, each crush detection method that has been used to date can
be classified into one of two generic groups; explicit methods and implicit
methods. These two generic methodologies are outlined below, along with a
brief discussion of their relative strengths and weaknesses.
4.1 Implicit
The implicit methodology is the original crush detection approach, and is
still highly popular, being used in a large number of simulation models[10].
This methodology relies on the expert analysis of factors such as population
density (see Section 2.1), behavioural analysis, and environmental considera-
tions. The analysis of conditions within these models, therefore, is left to the
engineer, who interprets the output of the simulation to determine whether
crush conditions have occurred.
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Implicit modelling does not take into account the possibility that evac-
uees may exhibit any competitive egress behaviours (e.g. pushing), as there
is no accurate method for simulating these behaviours without the inclu-
sion of force calculations. This makes it ideally suited for general evacuation
simulations; i.e. timely evacuations under “ideal” conditions.
As the exact force being exerted upon individuals is never calculated,
the precise physical danger that may exist in the evacuation can never be
quantified. The only assertion that can be made, based on an implicit analysis,
is that crush conditions may form during the evacuation in question. The
benefit of this approach is that, as the physical force calculation are not
performed, it requires far less processing power than other methods.
There are too many implementations of the implicit methodology to list
here but a popular, well documented example is Simulex[11], from Crowd
Dynamics Ltd.
4.2 Explicit
The explicit modelling of crush conditions incorporates an assessment of crush
into the model itself, and therefore requires less user analysis than the implicit
approach. Often based on the calculation of Newtonian force values, and
generally operating in 2-dimensional space, explicit methodologies may be
used to detect the presence of crush conditions much more precisely than
would be possible with implicit modelling techniques. By simulating the exact
forces being exerted by each individual, and enabling the propagation of forces
throughout a crowd, the explicit methodology can be used to measure the
exact amount of force that any individual is subject to. This, therefore, offers
the possibility of quantifying the dangers that individuals may face, which is
not possible using the implicit modelling techniques.
Whilst the explicit methodologies offer an accurate measure of the forces
acting within a crowd, the calculations needed to measure force require much
more processing power than an implicit implementation, so there exists a
definite trade-off between the two techniques.
The most well-known implementation of this methodology is the Social
Forces Model[12], which combines the force equations mentioned above with
the modelling of the social forces acting within crowds. Although the origi-
nal Social Forces Model was created as a learning tool, rather than an full-
featured simulation environment, the model has recently been incorporated
into the FDS+Evac Simulation environment[13].
5 Our Proposed Approach
We propose a three stage approach to this problem, consisting of separate
processes for the identification, qualification, and quantification of crush
Prediction and Mitigation of Crush Conditions in Emergency Evacuations 9
conditions. By employing different methods for all three stages of the anal-
ysis, we believe that the entire process may be completed at relatively low
computational expense. We hope to implement these techniques as part of a
suite of applications, that would offer existing egress simulations the possi-
bility of including either full or partial crush analyses, depending on the level
of accuracy required.
Two of the three techniques that we propose are still relatively novel
and untested, so will require validation before they would be suitable for
integration into existing environments. Each methodology will be fully tested
as stand-alone applications, but a full validation will be required before the
concepts are proven. At present, the team intends to attempt to integrate
the applications into the open source simulation environment FDS+Evac, to
enable full validation of the models, including historical data validation and
peer validation[14].
5.1 Identification
In order to first identify crush conditions, we propose treating their forma-
tion as a simple phase transition, similar to those found in many social and
biological systems[15]. In many of these systems a point is reached at which a
change (often an abrupt change) can be observed, this change is characterised
as a movement away from one general rule of system behaviour to another,
different set of observable behaviours that dictate the state of the system as
a whole.
In egress situations, a crowd will usually head towards the most familiar
exit, often forming groups either before or during this action. The evacuees
that make up these groups will have similar trajectories to their closest neigh-
bours and will be travelling at a similar speed (i.e the flow, within each group,
can be considered laminar). This would form the general rule for the ordered
state of this system (see Fig 1 - A). If the evacuees are impeded in any way
during their exit (e.g. they come across an obstacle in their path, or reach a
congested area), they will reduce their speed and be forced to change their
directions of movement, or forced to remain stationary (i.e. the flow becomes
non-laminar, or turbulent). This would form the general rule for the disor-
dered state of this system (see Fig 1 - B).
Buckingham’s Π Theorem[16] is a key theorem in dimensional analysis,
and can be used to create a set of dimensionless variables that allow the anal-
ysis of an unfamiliar system, i.e. a system for which the equations governing
its behaviour are either partially or wholly unknown. We will apply this the-
orem to the agent data within an egress model, to reduce the system to a
number of dimensionless quantities, which can then be analysed to ascertain
the state of the system at any one time. The advantage of this approach
is that both the agent’s physical variables (e.g. speed, direction, mass) and
their decision making variables (e.g. perceived level of threat, tendency to-
10 P. J. Harding, M. Amos, and S. Gwynne
A B
Fig. 1. Slide A shows an example of the movement vectors of evacuees during the
ordered state of the system, with all vectors showing a good deal of similarity. Slide
B shows example vectors during the disordered state, with the vectors varying a
great deal more in both direction and magnitude
ward competition) are considered, which will provide a more comprehensive
analysis of crush than could be achieved by movement variables alone.
Further analysis is achieved by the use of Mutual Information (MI)[17], a
technique that has been used to quantify the similarity of two signals. This
methodology was first used by Wicks et al [18] to detect phase transitions
within a well-known flocking model[19], and was found to accurately identify
the point of phase transition even when only a subset of the agents’ data were
analysed. We will employ a similar methodology to detect the formation of
crush conditions within localised groups of agents, using the MI method to
quantify the extent to which our “idealised” (ordered) agent-state (see fig 1),
differs to that of the current state. We will dynamically restructure agents into
groups, based on their current locale, and treat each group as a system within
its own right, tracking a subset of each “sub-system” to identify the earliest
stages of crush formation without the need to track every agent throughout
the entire evacuation.
5.2 Qualification
To qualify the presence of crush conditions within the crowd, we intend to use
a time-series, neural network classifier[20] to analyse the agent variables and
movement patterns. This will give an indication of the amount of pressure
that is likely being exerted on the individual in the crowd. The classifier
acts as a statistical data analysis tool, and is configured to recognise the
conditional similarities shared by individuals affected by the onset of crush
conditions.
The neural network approach has been selected for two main reasons.
Firstly, after the initial training program, the neural network approach re-
quires far less computational power to make its classification than other sta-
tistical analysis techniques, reducing the classification during normal running
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conditions to little more than matrix arithmetic. The reduction in computa-
tion, in relation to other techniques, will free up system resources for utili-
sation by other tasks. Secondly, the method of classification used in a neural
network is highly robust, as it does not rely on any “system specific” variables,
which makes the deployment of this technique possible across a wide range
of existing egress simulations, without the need for extensive configuration.
By employing a time-series, neural network[21] (i.e. a neural network that
accepts input in the form of sequential data representing changes over time),
we also hope to identify the qualitative similarities of individuals exhibiting
competitive egress behaviour. It will enable us to analyse growing behavioural
trends, rather than just classify an agent’s behaviour at one precise moment
in time.
To train the network, we will collect time-series agent data from a “full-
force” simulation, i.e. a simulation in which a physical force model is running,
which should enable the network to recognise the qualitative similarities that
individuals affected by crush share. We hope that training the network using
this type of data will allow the network to associate the existence of a variety
of conditions to the presence of crush, therefore negating the need to engage
a physics engine for all subsequent simulation runs.
5.3 Quantification
To fully quantify the effects of force propagating through a crowd, a phys-
ical force model is employed, based on the explicit crush detection method
mentioned previously(see Section 4.2). We currently plan to implement this
physical force model as a rigid body dynamics engine[22], with representations
of such variables as mass, velocity, friction, and force propagation, modelled
according to the laws of Newtonian mechanics. The engine will solve simpli-
fied physical equations in two dimensional space, resulting in good approx-
imations[23] of force calculations that can be completed in as little time as
possible.
The possibility of modelling this phenomena as a soft body dynamical
system will be investigated, as recent research has highlighted the need to
incorporate calculations for the compression forces acting within crowds[24],
but our initial research into the feasibility of this approach leads us to be-
lieve that the calculations involved would be prohibitively computationally
expensive at this time.
5.4 Hybrid Approach
The methodologies outlined above may each be employed individually, to
add differing degrees of crush analysis to a simulation, but we also propose
a conceptual framework, within which all three methodologies could be com-
bined to create an analytical tool that applies crush calculations intelligently.
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This approach will allow us to retain the accuracy of force calculations whilst
reducing the computational expense associated with it.
The proposed approach requires the analysis of conditions based on locale,
i.e. analysing conditions in different locations as if they were separate systems,
and the escalation of analytical accuracy upon confirmation of crush. Figure 2
shows the flow of control across the three applications.
Model Input
Identification
MI Analysis
Crush present
Qualification
ANN Classifier
Crush present
Quantification
Physics Engine
Physics Engine
Output
No Yes
No Yes
Fig. 2. Process flow diagram depicting the interactions between the three applica-
tion, according to the suggested framework.
By applying the more accurate analyses only once crush has been con-
firmed by the previous method, the most computationally expensive tech-
niques will only be applied to affected areas, rather than across the entire
behaviour space. This leaves us with the possibility of having different analy-
ses being applied simultaneously, within the same simulation, but in different
geographical locales, e.g. the identification method is running on a corridor
where the flow of pedestrians is laminar, whilst at the exit of a stairwell,
where a crowd has formed, the analysis would be carried out by the quan-
tification method. The advantage of engaging each application in this way
is that it will ensure that the most serious effects of crush, the build up of
forces within a crowd, are measured precisely, without calculating force for
all agents within the simulation.
6 Benefits of our Approach
This approach to crush analysis will provide a new tool, suitable for inte-
gration into existing simulation environments, that will allow engineers the
ability to incorporate different levels of analysis for each specific simulation.
The inclusion of such analytical methods will add a further dimension to
traditional models, and further the realism of current simulation tools.
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The addition of crush analysis techniques into models will allow engineers
to better test the robustness of evacuation procedures, carry out more realistic
recreations of historical incidents, and more comprehensively investigate the
safety of architectural designs. It is the aim of this project to supply further
tools to the evacuation sciences community that will allow this to happen,
and act as a further weapon in the armoury of the engineers, technicians, and
analysts that operate in this field.
7 Conclusion
The need for further crush analysis techniques has been clearly stated, and
the phenomena that we wish to simulate precisely defined. We have pre-
sented three methodologies for the detection, confirmation, and measurement
of crush conditions within a simulation environment, and a theoretical frame-
work within which they could operate in unison, reducing computational ex-
pense without a reduction in accuracy.
The short-term goal of this research is simply to prove the suitability of
these concepts for use in the analysis of crush, by the creation of a prototype
implementation that may be used for experimentation. In the long-term we
are looking to integrate this prototype into a larger simulation environment,
to prove its feasibility as an “off the shelf” component to an evacuation model.
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